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Constitutional Law. Ahlburn v. Clark, 728 A.2d 449 (R.I. 1999).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that section 44-18-
30(30) of the Rhode Island General Laws,' exempting bibles and
other canonized scriptures from the state sales tax, violates the
Free Press Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.2 The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that while
the statute granted tax exemptions to certain "religious" publica-
tions, other publications were not afforded similar tax treatment
due to their content. 3 The court, therefore, held that such a statute
violates the First Amendment because it unlawfully classifies and
rewards certain publications based upon their content.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This cause of action originated from the promulgation of Regu-
lation SU 92-136 by the defendant Gary Clark, Tax Administrator
of the State of Rhode Island (tax administrator).5 The regulation,
which made bibles and other canonized scriptures subject to state
sales tax, was enacted in response to Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul-
lock,6 where a similar sales tax exemption for bibles and other reli-
gious literature was found unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court. 7 The tax administrator's regulation, however,
conflicted with the mandate of section 44-18-30(30) of the Rhode
Island General Laws, which exempts bibles and other canonized
scriptures from the Rhode Island sales tax.8 Thus, because the
newly enacted regulation contradicted the explicit command of the
statute, Rhode Island book sellers and buyers were in the dark as
1. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-18-30(30) (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (providing
that no sales tax shall be due "[firom the sale and from the storage, use, or other
consumption in the state of any canonized scriptures of any tax exempt non-profit
religious organization including but not limited to the Old Testament and the New
Testament versions"). Notably, other sub-sections of the same statute similarly
exempted newspapers, textbooks, and promotional boat literature. See R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 44-18-2, -37, -39 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
2. See U.S. Const. amend. I. (stating that "[Ciongress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."). The Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies such a prohibition to the states. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Ahlburn v. Clark, 728 A.2d 449, 453 (R.I. 1999).
4. See id.
5. See id. at 451.
6. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
7. See id.
8. See Ahlburn, 728 A.2d at 450.
SURVEY SECTION
to whether the sales of bibles and other canonized scriptures were
subject to the state sales tax.9
As a result of the conflict, commercial retailers and consumers
filed an action in the district court seeking injunctive and declara-
tory relief with respect to the constitutionality of section 44-18-
30(30).10 The district court held that the statute exempting bibles
from state sales tax was unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 1 However, the district court de-
nied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief because the regula-
tion remained effective without the contradicting statute.12
Ultimately, the tax administrator and the Division of Taxation (the
State) petitioned for certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first addressed whether the
plaintiffs had standing to assert their claims. In do so, the court
applied the standing requirements recently addressed in Pontbri-
and v. Sundlun14 and found that the plaintiffs had standing be-
cause they alleged an "injury in fact resulting from the challenged
[act]."'1 Specifically, the plaintiffs were sellers and buyers of reli-
gious publications who alleged injury from the conflicting statute
and regulation, which collectively rendered them unable to deter-
mine whether to collect and remit sales tax on such purchases and
sales.",
The Rhode Island Supreme Court then affirmed the district
court's ruling that section 44-18-30(30) was unconstitutional, but
9. The plaintiffs in this action initially petitioned the tax administrator for a
conclusive ruling as to whether the regulation or the statute would apply to their
future transactions in the once-exempted literature. The tax administrator was
unable to resolve the conflict, except to emphasize the applicability of the regula-
tion. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 451.
13. See id. at 450.
14. 699 A.2d 856 (R.I. 1997).
15. Id. at 862 (quoting Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 317
A.2d 124, 129 (R.I. 1974)).
16. See Ahlburn, 728 A.2d at 451. As evidence of potential injury to the plain-
tiffs, the court noted the potential liability to retailers from uncollected and unpaid
sales taxes. See id. at 451-52.
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on the ground that it violates the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment, rather than the Establishment Clause. 17 Accord-
ingly, the remainder of the court's opinion dealt with the First
Amendment's Free Press guaranty.
In support of its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
lied heavily on the rationale and holding of Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject, Inc. v. Ragland.18 In Ragland, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a comparable Arkansas statute that exempted
certain publications from the state sales tax.19 The United States
Supreme Court found the statute to be unconstitutional because "a
statute operating in such a way that a given publication's tax sta-
tus depends entirely upon its content is particularly repugnant to
the First Amendment."20 Indeed, in this case the statute granted
tax benefits to publications because of their religious content,
while other publications, because of their non-religious content,
were subject to the sales tax. Thus, the court determined that such
content-based discrimination was a "paradigmatic example" of
what the Free Press Clause was designed to prohibit. 21
In order to justify such a classified taxation program, the State
needed to show that the statute was necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and that the statute was tightly tailored to
achieve such an end.22 The State, however, advanced only one
state interest in support of the statutory tax exemption-namely,
the State's interest in promoting religious activity and non-profit
groups.23 While assuming that such a concern was indeed compel-
ling, the court reasoned that "the Legislature's placement of a
sales-tax exemption for canonized religious literature in a section
of the General Laws that also exempts newspapers, textbooks, and
promotional boat literature . . . is not carefully drawn to achieve
that end."2 4 Consequently, the court pronounced that the exemp-
tion was particularly underinclusive to accomplish the legislature's
17. See id. at 452.
18. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
19. See Ahlburn, 728 A.2d at 452-53.
20. Id. at 453 (citing Ragland, 481 U.S. at 230).
21. See id.
22. See id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581-85 (1983)).
23. See id. at 453-54.
24. Id. at 454.
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broad-based purpose of advancing the well-being of Rhode Island's
citizens.25
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Ahlburn v.
Clark demonstrates that a state statute will be subject to height-
ened judicial review whenever it draws a content-based classifica-
tion that implicates constitutional concerns. Since these tax
exemptions applied solely to the sale of canonized scriptures and
other religious publications, the court unearthed the General As-
sembly's obvious intent to "engage in" a preferential effort to foster
the communication of certain privileged publications in a manner
that is anything but content neutral."26 Moreover, under Ahlburn,
a heavy burden is placed on the state to show that the challenged
statute necessarily serves a compelling state interest and that the
statute is carefully tailored to achieve such an end.
Rory Zack Fazendeiro
25. See id.
26. Id.
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Constitutional Law. FUD'S, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692 (R.I.
1999). The statutory procedures of the Fair Employment Practices
Act (FEPA),1 which grants the right to bypass the Rhode Island
Commission for Human Rights and file suit in superior court to the
employee only, violates the employer's right to a jury trial guaran-
teed by article 1, section 15 of the Rhode Island Constitution. A
claim brought pursuant to FEPA is analogous to a common law
action at law, and the court may award a legal remedy to the em-
ployee. Accordingly, the right to a trial by jury is guaranteed by
the Rhode Island Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case originated with a charge filed by Denise A. Thayer
(Thayer) with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights
(Commission). Thayer was a former employee of FUD'S, where she
worked as a waitress. 2 Thayer suffered from a degenerative myo-
pia in both eyes, which allegedly prevented her from operating a
motor vehicle. 3 At some point during the course of her employ-
ment, Thayer was asked about her ability to drive herself to work
and back. 4 Thayer claimed that FUD'S fired her because of her
disability, discriminating against her with respect to the terms and
conditions of her employment.5 FUD's maintained that Thayer
was not fired, but that she refused to continue working at the
restaurant.6
The Commission investigated Thayer's charge, and upon find-
ing probable cause to support her claim, the Commission issued a
notice of hearing.7 Following the hearing, a decision was issued,
finding that FUD'S discriminated against Thayer regarding the
terms and conditions of her employment, and also refused to grant
her reasonable accommodations for her disability.8 The Commis-
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-24.1 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
2. See FUD'S, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 694 (R.I. 1999).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. Both actions violate the Fair Employment Practices Act, which
prohibits, inter alia, firing an individual because of a disability, or refusing to rea-
sonably accommodate an individual's disability. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (1956)
(1995 Reenactment).
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sion granted Thayer $14,201.18 in back pay and $7,000 in compen-
satory damages.9 FUD'S was also ordered to rehire Thayer when a
waitressing position became available, and to cease and desist
from committing unlawful employment practices. 10
FUD'S appealed the Commission's decision to the superior
court, claiming that the procedures available to an employer under
the procedures of FEPA violated the Rhode Island Constitution by
denying an employer the right to a jury trial." The Attorney Gen-
eral intervened in support of FUD'S, and moved to certify the ques-
tion of whether the FEPA procedures violated the right to a jury
trial to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.12 The superior court
granted the Attorney General's request, and the supreme court an-
swered the certified question.' 3
BACKGROUND
Under the Fair Employment Practices Act, employees and
other aggrieved parties may file unlawful employment practice
charges against their employers with the Rhode Island Commis-
sion of Human Rights. 14 If the Commission finds probable cause to
support the employee's complaint, it can issue a complaint to the
employer and notice a hearing.15 At this point, the employee may
choose to have the complaint heard by a hearing officer on behalf of
the Commission, or, if the employee files a request with the Com-
mission between 120 days and two years after the charge is filed,
the employee may bypass the Commission and file suit in the supe-
rior court.' 6 The Commission is required to grant the employee's
request within 30 days. 17
Once the complaint has been filed in the superior court, either
the employee or the employer may request a jury trial.'8 Unlike
the employee, the employer cannot request that the complaint be
9. See FUD'S, 727 A.2d at 694-95.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 695.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 693; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
15. See id. at 693-94; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-18 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
16. See id. at 694.
17. See id. However, the employee may not request a right-to-sue authoriza-
tion from the Commission once the hearing has begun. See id.
18. See id.
20001
648 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601
transferred to superior court.19 Therefore, the employer's right to
request a jury trial is triggered only after the employee opts to by-
pass the Commission and file suit in superior court.20 If the em-
ployee chooses to have the charge heard by the Commission, there
is no jury present, and any subsequent appeal in the superior court
is reviewed under the provisions of the Rhode Island Administra-
tive Procedures Act.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by article I, section 15 of
the Rhode Island Constitution, which states that "[tihe right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate."22 The Rhode Island Constitu-
tion became effective in 1843.23 Therefore, a jury trial is available
to any plaintiff or defendant in a legal action that would have been
heard by a jury in the year 1843.24
When determining whether a particular cause of action trig-
gers the right to a jury trial, the court engages in two inquires.
First, the court determines whether the cause of action at issue or
an analogous cause of action was amenable to a jury trial in
1843.25 Second, the court asks whether the remedies available are
equitable or legal in nature.26 The "available relief' inquiry is the
more important of the two, and if the relief is legal, the parties
have a right to a jury trial.27
In the present case, the court noted that until 1991, the reme-
dies available to an employee under the FEPA were largely equita-
ble in nature, encompassing cease and desist orders, back pay,
reinstatement, and upgrade of the employee. 28 However, in 1991,
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 (1956) (1993 Reenactment). Under this statute,
the superior court must defer to the hearing commissioner's judgment on the
weight of the evidence and questions of fact. The decision can be reversed or modi-
fied only if they are in violation of the law, in excess of the agency's authority, the
result of unlawful procedure, made in error of law, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary
and capricious. See id.
22. R.I. Const. art I, § 15.
23. See FUD'S, 727 A.2d at 695.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987)).
28. See id. at 695-96.
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the FEPA was amended to authorize the award of compensatory
and punitive damages against an employer by the Commission. 29
Noting that compensatory and punitive damages are forms of legal
relief, the Rhode Island Supreme Court began an additional in-
quiry, which it characterized as a "distinctly more historical ap-
proach with respect to this issue than the [United States] Supreme
Court."30
Before concluding that a cause of action includes the right to a
jury trial under the Rhode Island Constitution, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court makes a particularized inquiry into the historical
and common-law treatment of the remedies available under the
cause of action before the merger of law and equity.31 The court
concluded that both punitive and compensatory damages were con-
sidered legal relief in both the Rhode Island courts and the federal
courts. 32 Prior to the merger of law and equity, juries were seen as
better suited to determine the amount of legal damages a plaintiff
should receive, rather than "the conscience of an equity judge."33
Here, the compensatory and punitive damages that may be
awarded under the FEPA are a significant portion of the relief that
an employee may seek.34 Therefore, the supreme court held that a
cause of action brought under the FEPA is most similar to an ac-
tion at law, and triggers the right to a jury trial for the employer as
well as the employee. 35
In addition to concluding that employers have a right to a jury
trial for a claim brought pursuant to the FEPA, the supreme court
also took the opportunity to answer the question of whether the
General Assembly could assign duties traditionally fulfilled by the
judiciary to administrative bodies.36 While noting that a FEPA ac-
tion does involve "public rights," the resolution of which may be
delegated solely to an administrative agency, 37 the court held that
29. See id. at 696; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-24(b) and 28-5-29.1 (1956) (1995
Reenactment).
30. See FUD's, 727 A.2d at 696.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 696-97.
33. Id. at 697 (quoting 2 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 794, at 1-2
& n.1 (12th ed. 1877).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 698.
37. See id. (citing National Velour Corp. v. Durfee, 637 A.2d 375, 379 (R.I.
1994)).
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the availability of legal remedies places a FEPA action in the cate-
gory of hybrid causes of action.38 Thus, the court resolved a ques-
tion it previously declined to answer, concluding that there is a
right to a jury trial where a claim involves both public rights and a
complainant's right to receive a legal remedy.39
CONCLUSION
In FUD'S Inc. v. State, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ce-
mented an employer's right to a jury trial where an employee files
a charge against the employer under the FEPA. In so holding, the
supreme court emphasized the importance of the historical analy-
sis employed by the court to determine whether a cause of action is
entitled to a jury trial under the Rhode Island Constitution, noting
that the inquiry is more specific than the one used by the United
States Supreme Court. Furthermore, the court concluded that the
"public rights" doctrine could not remove a claim encompassing the
right to receive a legal remedy from the jurisdiction of the superior
court.
Sarah K. Heaslip
38. See id.
39. See id.; National Velour, 637 A.2d at 380-81 n.8.
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Constitutional Law. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732
A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999). The Rhode Island Supreme Court advised that
the Rhode Island Ethics Commission acted beyond its constitu-
tional authority when it enacted a regulation which prohibits
members of the General Assembly from serving on public boards or
from participating in the appointment of any other person who is
to serve as a member of a public board. The regulation is unconsti-
tutional because it fundamentally alters the constitutional struc-
ture of the government of the State of Rhode Island.
In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,' the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was asked, by Governor Lincoln C. Almond, to is-
sue their advisory opinion on three questions of law pertaining to
the approval of Regulation 36-14-5014 (Regulation 5014). 2 The
court concluded that it was only proper to answer one of the ques-
tions in the form of an advisory opinion.3 The court thus advised
that Article III, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not
provide the ethics commission with the power to adopt Regulation
5014. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 20, 1997, pursuant to article X, section 3 of the
Rhode Island Constitution, Governor Lincoln C. Almond (the Gov-
ernor) propounded a request for an advisory opinion 5 to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, regarding the constitutionality of Regula-
tion 5014 promulgated by the ethics commission on May 5, 1997.6
In particular, the Governor asked:
1) Does Article III, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion, which empowers the Rhode Island Ethics Commission to
'adopt a code of ethics, including, but not limited to provisions
1. 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 57.
3. See id. at 72.
4. See id.
5. As noted by Justice Flanders in his separate opinion,
[iut is important to remember that the advisory opinions given by the Jus-
tices of this Court... are just that: advisory .... there is no binding legal
precedent created... [and] [flor these reasons, neither the proponents nor
the opponents of Regulation 5014 are bound by what the Justices of this
Court have said today."
Id. at 110.
6. See id. at 57.
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on conflicts of interest, . . . [and] use of position' provide the
Ethics commission with the power to adopt Regulation 36-14-
5014?
2) Is the principle of separation of powers contained in the
Rhode Island Constitution properly interpreted in the same
fashion as it has been interpreted in the United States Con-
stitution with respect to appointments, such that neither leg-
islators, nor their appointees, may serve on any public body
within the executive branch of state government, or state ex-
ecutive, public and quasi-public boards, authorities, corpora-
tions, commissions, councils or agencies except those which: i)
function solely in an advisory capacity; or ii) exercise solely
legislative functions?
3) Does the separation of powers principle contained in the
Rhode Island Constitution impose any limits whatsoever on
legislative appointments to a public board or body (as defined
above)? In particular, does the Constitution prohibit legisla-
tors and/or their appointees from constituting a majority of
the membership of a public board or body? Does the Consti-
tution prohibit appointment of sitting legislators to a public
board or body?7
Regulation 5014 provides:
Prohibited Activities-Members of the General Assembly-
Restrictions on activities relating to Public Boards.
(1) No member of the General Assembly shall serve as a
member of a Public Board. No member of the General Assem-
bly shall participate in the appointment, except through ad-
vice and consent as provided by law, of any other person to
serve as a member of a Public Board.
(2) For purposes of this regulation, 'Public Board' means all
public bodies within the executive branch of state govern-
ment, and all state executive, public and quasi-public boards,
authorities, corporations, commissions, councils or agencies;
provided, however, that the foregoing definition shall not ap-
ply to any such entity which (i) functions solely in an advisory
capacity, or (ii) exercises solely legislative functions.
(3) The effective date of this regulation is July 1, 1999.8
Pursuant to its authority under article III, sections 7 and 8 of
the Rhode Island Constitution, the Rhode Island Ethics Commis-
7. Id.
8. Id.
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sion adopted Regulation 5014.9 However, prior to the approval of
the regulation, the ethics commission sought advice regarding the
constitutional validity of the regulation.10 The feedback that the
commission received was that the regulation appeared to be uncon-
stitutional. 1 Regardless, the commission unanimously adopted
Regulation 5014.12
Although the regulation was adopted in May 1997, its effective
date was delayed until July 1, 1999, so that the Governor could
request an advisory opinion from the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 13 On November 10, 1998, the court heard oral arguments
on the matter.14
BACKGROUND
In November 1986, the Rhode Island Constitution was
amended to incorporate an ethics commission, an independent,
non-partisan body, which would oversee state and local govern-
ment ethics.' 5 The 1986 ethics amendment to the constitution is
embodied in article III, sections 7 and 8.16 Section 8 mandates
that the General Assembly establish the ethics commission which
in turn would adopt a code of ethics that would apply to all public
officials and employees, as stated in section seven. 17 Article 3, sec-
tion 8 also establishes the ethics commission's duties and provides
that "[tihe ethics commission shall have the authority to investi-
gate violations of the code of ethics and to impose penalties, as pro-
9. See id. at 58. Regulation 5014 was proposed as regulation 5.13A, but was
renumbered. See id. The regulation was only adopted in May 1997, after a series
of public hearings required by the Code of Ethics, R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-14-9(3)
(1956) (1994 Reenactment), and the Administrative Procedures Act, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 42-35-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment). See id.
10. See id. The ethics commission sought the advice of its executive director,
its legal counsel (who declined to provide the commission with a legal opinion) and
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard of the University of Pennsylvania. See id. Professor
Hazard is "a nationally renowned scholar and authority in the field of ethics in
government and ethics legislation." Id.
11. See id. at 58-59 (referring, in particular, to the opinions conveyed by the
commission's executive director and Professor Hazard).
12. See id. at 59.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 57-58.
16. See id. at 58.
17. See id.
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vided by law; and the commission shall have the power to remove
from office officials who are not subject to impeachment."18
ADVISORY OPINION AND ANALYSIS
1986 State Constitution
The court commenced its advisory opinion by noting that, as a
procedural matter, it was not required to give its opinion on the
constitutionality of statutes which were not yet effective. 19 The
court stated that it has previously interpreted article X, section 3
of the Rhode Island Constitution to declare that the court is only
required to give its opinion when questions of law are propounded
by the Governor or General Assembly if the constitutionality of an
existing statute is at issue.20 However, the court stated that
although Regulation 5014 was not yet effective, it would render its
advisory opinion due to the significant constitutional issue and
great public interest involved.21
The court found that article III, sections 7 and 8 of the Rhode
Island Constitution grant the ethics commission the authority to
establish a code of ethics, investigate violations of the code and en-
force the code's provisions. 22 However, the court stated that the
power granted to the ethics commission is not limitless, because
the commission is subject to judicial review. 23 Furthermore, the
court noted that the commission was not a separate, fourth branch
of government, but was to work concurrently with the General As-
sembly which, pursuant to the Rhode Island Constitution, reserved
authority to enact codes of ethics legislation.24
The court also declared that it would determine whether the
ethics commission exceeded its authority by promulgating Regula-
tion 5014 de novo, without deference to the agency's interpreta-
18. Id. (quoting R.I. Const. art. III, § 8).
19. See id. at 59.
20. See id. (citing In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 666 (R.I.
1993)).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 60 (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1, 10-
11 (R.I. 1992)).
23. See id.
24. See id. (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 14).
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tion.25 The court applied this standard because it was faced with
questions of law, rather than questions of fact which require the
court to show great deference to the agency's interpretation. 26
Purpose and Scope of Regulation 5014
The court found that the commission unequivocally exceeded
its constitutional authority by promulgating Regulation 5014 be-
cause it interfered with the constitutionally structured govern-
ment.27 The court opined that when the ethics commission was
created, it was not to be a limitless, unfettered fourth arm of gov-
ernment.28 As a result, it did not have the power to sit as a "consti-
tutional convention" and alter the structure of government.29
Rather, the commission was found to have a compilation of legisla-
tive, judicial and executive functions.30
The court stated that the constitutional framework of the gov-
ernment was being altered by the ethics commission by way of
Regulation 5014 because it prohibited members of the General As-
sembly from serving on any public boards.3 ' The effect of the regu-
lation also made it a violation for a member of the General
Assembly to participate in the appointment of a public board mem-
ber, except through advice and consent.3 2 However, each of these
responsibilities is rightfully reserved to the General Assembly by
way of article VI, section 10 of the 1986 Rhode Island Constitution
which states that the general assembly shall "continue to exercise
the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this
Constitution."33 The court then recounted a brief history of the
25. See id. at 60 (citing City of East Providence v. Public Utilities Commission,
566 A.2d 1305, 1307 (R.I. 1989); Stephen G. Bryer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 371 (1986)).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 68.
28. See id. at 62.
29. See id. at 61-62.
30. See id. at 61.
31. See id.
32. See id. The court also notes at this point that if Regulation 5014 were to
be deemed valid, then the membership of the ethics commission itself would be
illegal considering the General Assembly participated in the appointments of the
members. See id.
33. See id. at 62 (quoting R.I. Const. art. VI, § 10 (1986)).
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Rhode Island government and concluded that the General Assem-
bly has appointive powers dating back to 1663.34
The court also found that Regulation 5014 itself is unconstitu-
tional for two other reasons.3 5 First, it violates the basic constitu-
tional principle that every person is presumed innocent until
proven otherwise by an impartial jury.36 The court noted that Reg-
ulation 5014 singles out General Assembly members as guilty of a
conflict of interest or abuse of their positions if they serve on a pub-
lic board or partake in the appointments of such.37 Nothing in ar-
ticle III, section 8 gives the ethics commission this authority.38
Second, the scope of Regulation 5014 is too broad. 39 The effect of
the regulation restructures Rhode Island's government. 40 The reg-
ulation is thus inconsistent with the constitutional authority dele-
gated to the ethics commission. 41
The court concluded by stating that "the function of the com-
mission is to adopt regulations that would prevent improper con-
duct or self-dealing on the part of elected or appointed officials, not
to create changes in the structure of government on the basis of the
commission's belief that such change would lead to better ethical
conduct."42 As a result, the court found that it was beyond the
scope of the ethics commission to adopt Regulation 5014 and that
the regulation was unconstitutional. 43
The court's conclusion served only to answer the first of the
three questions posed to it by Governor Almond.44 The court de-
clined to answer questions two and three on the basis that these
questions required fact finding and the court has previously held
that it lacks "the power to issue advisory opinions which implicate
34. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 732 A.2d at 63-65 (encapsu-
lating the history of Rhode Island government, in particular the traditional powers
maintained by the General Assembly).
35. See id. at 66.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 68.
40. See id.
41. See id. As noted earlier, art. III, § 8 of the Rhode Island Constitution
"grants to the ethics commission 'the limited and concurrent power to enact sub-
stantive ethics laws[,]' and to investigate and sanction violations thereof." Id.
(quoting In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 10-11, 14).
42. Id. at 71.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 72.
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fact-finding."45 Therefore, the court found that an advisory opinion
was not a proper forum in which to answer these questions and
that it would answer the queries when a litigated case was
presented. 46
Justice Flanders' Opinion
Justice Flanders opined that the ethics commission acted
within its constitutional powers in promulgating Regulation 5014
and that Regulation 5014 is a valid ethics provision. 47 Justice
Flanders disagreed with the majority of the court and instead of
applying a de novo standard of review, he accorded deference to the
ethics commission's interpretation of its enabling laws.48 Justice
Flanders found that "the commission's adoption of Regulation 5014
constitutes a legislative enactment pursuant to an express consti-
tutional provision authorizing such activity,"49 and thereby stated
that it could only be declared unconstitutional if it was proven as
such beyond a reasonable doubt.50 Therefore, Justice Flanders
concluded that because the opponents were unable to meet the bur-
den established, Regulation 5014 was promulgated within the con-
stitutional scope of the ethics commission's powers. 51
Justice Flanders next decided that Regulation 5014 itself is a
valid provision primarily because: 1) the scope of the regulation is
confined to executive boards and not all public boards,52 2) the
plain meaning of article III, section 8 of the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion grants the commission the power to adopt this regulation,53 3)
it is consistent with a 1993 advisory opinion issued by the court,5 4
4) this would not result in the ethics commission sitting in the ca-
pacity as a "fourth branch" of government with limitless powers, 55
and 5) the regulation is consistent with other similar bans on pub-
45. Id. (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 324 A.2d 641, 647-48
(R.I. 1974)).
46. See id. at 72-73.
47. See id. at 77.
48. See id. at 75-77.
49. Id. at 76.
50. See id. at 77.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 77-79.
53. See id. at 79-82.
54. See id. at 82-86.
55. See id. at 86-90.
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lic officials' participation in multiple office holding.5 6 Justice Flan-
ders opined that the Rhode Island Constitution's clear and
unambiguous language contained in article I, sections 7 and 8,
grant the commission the power to adopt ethical regulations such
as Regulation 5014, regardless of its ramifications. 57
Justice Flanders also took the opportunity to answer questions
two and three, finding that answering all of the questions queried
by the Governor is necessary because the Governor is relying on
the answers in order to fulfill his present and future executive du-
ties.58 Justice Flanders began answering the second question by
pointing out that textual differences exist between the federal and
state constitutions regarding separation of powers. 59 He stated
that although the separation of powers principle on the state level
may not be interpreted exactly the same as on the federal level,
overall the same separation of powers principle applies.60
Justice Flanders answered the third question in the affirma-
tive, finding that the Rhode Island Constitution does impose limits
on legislative appointments to a public board.6 1 However, he
opined that the Rhode Island Constitution does not prohibit the
mere appointment of sitting legislators to each and every public
board or body, irrespective of their executive function. 62 Beyond
this, Justice Flanders stated that a more particular response could
only be rendered in light of a specific case.63
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was asked by Governor Al-
mond to give its opinion on three specific questions regarding the
separation of powers in Rhode Island. The supreme court found
that it was only proper to address one of the questions in the form
56. See id. at 91-96.
57. See id. at 96.
58. See id. at 97.
59. See id. For example, Justice Flanders indicates that art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the
United States Constitution contains a general appointments clause which does not
appear in the state constitution. See id. Rather, art. IX, § 5 and art. IV, § 4 of the
state constitution gives the Governor and General Assembly the power to partici-
pate in specific appointments and elections. See id.
60. See id. at 110.
61. See id.
62. See id. (citing Parcell v. State, 620 P.2d 834, 836 (Kan. 1980)).
63. See id.
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of an advisory opinion. To this end, the supreme court opined that
the ethics commission exceeded its constitutional authority, em-
bodied in article III, sections 7 and 8 of the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion, when it promulgated Regulation 5014. Regulation 5014
prohibits members of the General Assembly from serving as mem-
bers of public boards or from participating in appointments of
other persons to serve as members of a public board. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court stated that the commission thus exceeded
its authority because it interfered with the constitutional structure
of the Rhode Island government by promulgating the regulation.
The court also found that Regulation 5014 itself was unconsti-
tutional. The court stated that the regulation was invalid because
its scope was too broad and it violated the presumption that a per-
son is innocent until proven guilty. The court concluded that the
ethics commission was established to adopt regulations to prevent
improper conduct or self-dealings, to investigate violations and to
enforce the code of ethics provisions. The ethics commission was
not established to alter the constitutional structure of Rhode
Island.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne
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Constitutional Law. Rhode Island Association of Realtors, Inc.
v. Whitehouse, 51 F. Supp.2d 107 (D.R.I. 1999). The antisolicita-
tion provision of section 38-2-6 of the Rhode Island General Laws,
prohibiting the use of public information for commercial solicita-
tion, violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Once information has been classi-
fied as a "public record," the State of Rhode Island cannot constitu-
tionally limit its use for legitimate commercial purposes unless the
limitation can be justified under the four-part test laid out in Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.'
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Rhode Island Association of Realtors v. Whitehouse,2 the
Rhode Island Association of Realtors, Inc. (the Association) filed
suit against the state of Rhode Island pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1983.3 The Association claimed that section 38-2-6 of the
Rhode Island General Laws unconstitutionally barred their ability
to perform, gain new members and market their services by
prohibiting access to certain public records. 4 The Association ar-
gued that section 38-2-6's ban on the use of public records "to so-
licit for commercial purposes or to obtain a commercial advantage
over the party furnishing that information to the public body"5 was
a violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution.6 Therefore, the Association sought
a declaratory judgment that section 38-2-6 of the Rhode Island
General Laws was unconstitutional, 7 and asked that an injunction
be granted in order to prevent the enforcement of the statute.8 The
Rhode Island Attorney General moved to dismiss due to lack of
standing and the Association moved for summary judgment.9
1. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2. 51 F. Supp.2d 107 (D.R.I. 1999).
3. See id. at 109.
4. See id. at 110.
5. R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-6 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
6. U.S. Const. amend. I.
7, See Rhode Island Assn. of Realtors, 51 F. Supp.2d at 110.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In reviewing the constitutionality of section 38-2-6, the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island applied the
four-part test promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v. Pubic Service Commission
of New York. 10 State regulation of commercial speech must be ana-
lyzed with respect to the following factors." First, the state must
determine whether or not the speech concerns a legal activity and
is not misleading. 12 Second, the state interest in the regulation
must be substantial. 13 Third, the regulation must directly advance
the state interest.14 Fourth, the state must not be able to accom-
plish its interest in any other way that is less intrusive than the
proposed regulation. 15
Applying the four-part test to the present case, the district
court found that Rhode Island's regulation of public records that
may be used for some legitimate commercial purpose was unconsti-
tutional.16 The court found that the proposed speech involved a
legal activity and was not misleading. 17 The burden then shifted
to the state to show that the "regulation is narrowly tailored to
directly advance a substantial governmental interest."18
The court found that the state had a "legitimate and substan-
tial interest" in regulating access to and use of personal informa-
tion given to governmental agencies by its citizens. 19 Although
Rhode Island may solicit private information from its citizens in
order to achieve a specific governmental purpose, that does not
give others the right to access such information if it is against the
wishes of the individual. 20 In such a situation there is absolutely
no justification for invading an individual's privacy interests. 21
10. See id. at 113.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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However, the court found that the Attorney General failed to
establish a substantial interest in "protecting the privacy of its citi-
zens as a justification for the limitations contained in § 38-2-6."22
The court further found that the State of Rhode Island failed to
show how section 38-2-6 served the state interest or why that in-
terest could not have been satisfied by excluding the individual's
private information from the definition of "public records." 23
Based on its analysis under the four-part test, the court found
that section 38-2-6's "blanket prohibition against using public in-
formation to solicit for commercial purposes" was unconstitu-
tional.24 However, the court did not invalidate the entire
statute. 25 Since the Rhode Island Public Records Act has a sever-
ability clause, a finding of unconstitutionality regarding a certain
provision of the chapter does not render the whole chapter uncon-
stitutional.26 Therefore, absent the antisolicitation clause, prohib-
iting the use of public information for commercial solicitation,
section 38-2-6 remains in full force. 27
CONCLUSION
In Rhode Island Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse,
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
held that the antisolicition provision of section 38-2-6 of the Rhode
Island General Laws was unconstitutional. Because the state's in-
terest in protecting the privacy of Rhode Island citizens could be
achieved through less restrictive means, the prohibition on the use
of public information for commercial solicitation violated the Free
Speech Clause of the United States Constitution.
Heather M. Spellman
22. Id. at 114.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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Constitutional Law. Rhode Island Medical Society v.
Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d 288 (D.R.I. 1999). Section 23-4.12 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, the partial birth abortion ban (the
Act), is unconstitutional. The entire Act is unconstitutional on
three grounds: the definition of "partial birth abortion" is vague,
the Act lacks an exception for the health of the mother, and the Act
does not provide an exception sufficient to safeguard the life of the
mother. In addition, the Act's civil remedies provision is unconsti-
tutional because it places an undue burden on the woman's right to
seek an abortion.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The General Assembly first passed a bill banning partial birth
abortions in 1996.1 This bill was signed into law by Governor Lin-
coln Almond on July 2, 1997. Plaintiffs, the Rhode Island Medical
Society, Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, Dr. Pablo Rodriguez
and Dr. Benjamin Vogel (Plaintiffs) sought and received a tempo-
rary restraining order against enforcement of the Act from the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island on
July 11, 1997.2
During the hearing on the temporary restraining order, the
district court stated that the Act appeared to be unconstitutional. 3
Thereafter, the case was stayed so that the General Assembly
could amend the Act.4 The amended bill was signed by Governor
Almond in July of 1998.5
As amended, the Act defined a" partial birth abortion" as "an
abortion in which the person performing the abortion vaginally de-
livers a living human fetus before killing the infant and completing
that delivery."6 The Act defines vaginal delivery of a living fetus as
the intentional delivery of a living fetus, or "a substantial portion
thereof" into the vagina. 7 The Act makes an exception for the life
of the mother, but does not mention the mother's health.8 In addi-
1. See Rhode Island Med. Soc. v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp.2d 288, 294 (D.R.I.
1999).
2. See id. at 299-300.
3. See id. at 294.
4. See id. at 300.
5. See id.
6. R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-4.12-1(a) (1956) (Supp. 1999).
7. Id. § 23-4.12-1(c).
8. Id. § 23-4.12-3.
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tion, the Act grants a private cause of action to the father of the
fetus and the maternal grandparents of the fetus unless they con-
sented to the abortion or caused the pregnancy by their own crimi-
nal conduct.9
Plaintiffs alleged that the amended Act was unconstitutional
and named Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse and Governor
Almond as defendants (Defendants). 10 A bench trial was con-
ducted on May 3-6, 1999. The trial consisted largely of the testi-
mony of medical experts; plaintiff Rodriguez and Dr. Phillip
Stubblefield for the plaintiffs, and Dr. Frank Boehm for the defend-
ants.1' All three experts were qualified as experts in abortion
practice, and various types of abortion procedures were described
to the court by the expert witnesses. 12 However, only the two abor-
tion procedures at issue in the present case, the D & E and D & X
procedures, will be described here.
In a D & E abortion,' 3 the fetus is removed from the woman's
body through the vagina after the doctor dilates her cervix and
uses suction and traction to dismember the fetus. 14 A D & E abor-
tion requires the physician to rupture the amniotic sac and cut the
fetus into parts before attempting to bring the fetus outside the
uterus and down through the vaginal canal. 1 Because the bones
of the fetus become stronger as the pregnancy progresses, a D & E
is usually performed only up until 23 weeks. 16 Although it is possi-
ble for a fetus to be removed from the uterus intact, this is not the
goal of a D & E abortion. At times, the body of the fetus is deliv-
ered up to the head, at which point the size of the skull prevents
the doctor from completely removing the fetus.' 7 However, this is
also considered a "rare event."' 8
The D & X abortion is a variation of the D & E procedure that
can be performed after the 24th week of pregnancy. 19 During this
9. Id. § 23-4.12-4(a).
10. See Rhode Island Med. Soc., 66 F. Supp.2d. at 295.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 295-98.
13. "D & E" is shorthand for "dilation and extraction," and is the most com-
mon method of abortion performed between 12 and 23 weeks. See id. at 296.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 297.
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procedure, also known as a partial birth abortion, the fetus is
brought out of the uterus and down the vaginal canal, feet first,
until the skull blocks further passage through the cervix. 20 At that
point, the skull is minimized by either crushing it with forceps, or
by evacuation of the brain.21 While the issue in the present case
revolves around the Act's definition of a partial birth abortion, all
three expert witnesses relied on the medically-accepted definition
adopted by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists (ACOG).22 ACOG defines a D & X abortion as one in which
(1) the cervix is deliberately dilated, (2) there is a conversion of the
fetus to a footling breach, (3) there is a breech extraction up to the
head, and (4) the brain of the fetus is removed to enable the intact
but dead fetus to be delivered vaginally.23
BACKGROUND
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees a woman's right to an abor-
tion before the fetus reaches viability. 24 In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,25 the United States Supreme Court held that state regula-
tion of abortion is constitutional unless it places an undue burden
on the woman's right to have an abortion. 26 The "undue burden"
test was described as "shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fe-
tus."27 Post-viability, states may go so far as to proscribe
abortions, but must make exceptions for instances where an abor-
tion is necessary to save the life or health of the mother.
28
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 300 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
25. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26. See id. at 876.
27. Id. at 877.
28. See Rhode Island Med. Soc., 66 F. Supp.2d at 300 (citing Women's Med.
Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Standing
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land first addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs had stand-
ing to bring this lawsuit. Where a plaintiff claims that a criminal
statute is unconstitutional on its face, a four-part test is applied to
determine whether the plaintiffs have standing.29 Because such
plaintiffs should not have to "violate the law and volunteer their
heads on the chopping block,"30 standing is established where the
plaintiffs show they intend to engage in a certain course of conduct,
the conduct is arguably affected by a constitutionally protected in-
terest, the challenged statute proscribes that conduct, and there is
a credible threat of prosecution. 31
No Rhode Island doctors currently perform the D & X abortion
procedure. 32 However, Dr. Rodriguez's testimony indicated that
all of the plaintiffs perform D & E abortions or have members that
perform D & E abortions.3 3 Doctors who perform abortions are af-
fected by a constitutional interest when a law threatens them with
criminal prosecution for providing a constitutionally protected
medical procedure. 34 Noting that the construction of the statute
was the ultimate issue in this case, the district court concluded
that for purposes of determining standing, it was sufficient that a
reasonable reading of the statute suggested that both D & E and D
& X abortions were proscribed by the statute.35 Finally, a credible
threat of prosecution exists where a statute facially restricts con-
stitutional rights.36 After noting that it was unclear whether D &
E abortions could trigger criminal prosecution, and that the civil
remedies provision could be pursued even if the State of Rhode Is-
land did not file criminal charges, the district court concluded that
plaintiffs met all four prongs of the standing test.37
29. See id. at 301.
30. Id.
31. See id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289,
299 (1979)).
32. See id. at 298.
33. See id. at 301.
34. See id. at 302.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 302-03.
37. See id. at 303-04.
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Construction of "Partial Birth Abortion" as Defined in the Act
The definitive issue for the district court was the definition of
the terms "partial birth abortion" and "substantial portion" con-
tained in Rhode Island General Laws section 23-4.12-1(a) & (c). 38
Although the defendants argued several limited definitions of "par-
tial birth abortions" at trial, such as the ACOG definition, the Gen-
eral Assembly did not include that definition in the Act.3 9
Therefore, the district court was required to determine whether a
reasonable construction of the Act would enable the Act to survive
plaintiffs constitutional challenge.
The district court noted that it was required to read the Act "in
a light favorable to seeing it as constitutional... [and] must con-
sider limiting constructions offered by the state."40 However, a
limited construction will only be applied where that construction is
reasonable.41 The district court-then concluded that none of the
constructions offered by the defendants were reasonable.4 2
The defendants argued that the Act applied only to partial
birth abortions as they were defined by ACOG, but the district
court stated that because this definition was not included in the
Act, it was unreasonable to read the Act as being directed at those
procedures alone.4 3 Defendants also argued that the Act only ap-
plied to delivery of an intact fetus or substantial portion thereof,
but again, the absence of the term "intact fetus" in the Act ren-
dered this construction unreasonable.44 Defendants then argued
that the Act only proscribed the partial birth of a viable child, but
the district court noted that "the Act does not limit itself to viable
births."45 Finally, defendants argued that the Act was limited to
proscribing abortions where the child is killed in the vagina as op-
posed to in the uterus.46 However, the medical testimony at trial
demonstrated that doctors could not differentiate between abor-
38. See id. at 305.
39. See id.
40. Id. (citing Forsyth County v. Nationalistic Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 1331
(1992)).
41. See id. (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)).
42. See id. at 306-07.
43. See id. at 306.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 307.
46. See id.
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tions that occur is the vagina or the uterus, which rendered this
construction unreasonable as well.4 7
After dismissing the constructions offered by the defendants
as unreasonable, the district court proceeded to delineate how the
Act would be read. The district court determined that the Act de-
fined a partial birth abortion as a procedure where the performing
physician knowingly engaged in a strict sequence of steps with the
intent to kill the infant.48 Under section 23-4.12(a) & (c), a partial
birth abortion is performed where a physician delivers a substan-
tial portion of the fetus into the vagina with the intention of killing
the fetus, that the physician then knowingly performs a procedure
that kills the infant, and then knowingly completes the delivery of
the infant.49
Examining the Act under the United States Constitution
After enunciating a reasonable construction of the Act, the dis-
trict court determined whether the Act could be constitutionally
applied to the abortion procedures in question.50 The district court
determined that despite the defendant's protestations to the con-
trary, the Act could proscribe D & E abortions.51 Because a D & E
abortion requires a doctor to reach into the uterus and remove as
much of the fetus as possible into the vagina, the doctor could be
viewed as having removed a "substantial portion" of the fetus
before knowingly killing the fetus in violation section 23-4.12-
1(c). 52
The district court's conclusion rested in part on its finding that
the term "'substantial portion' [was] vague and [does] not provide
doctors with sufficient guidance to know what the Legislature has
made illegal."53 The medical experts disagreed over whether deliv-
ery of a toe was enough, or if more than half of the fetus must be
delivered into the vagina.54 If doctors cannot decide whether a
procedure will be legal or not, they will assume the D & E is illegal,
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 308.
50. The court first found that the Act would not ban hysterectomies, hysterot-
omies, vacuum aspiration, or inductions. See id. at 308-09.
51. See id. at 309.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 310.
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producing a chilling effect that places an undue burden on the wo-
man's right to have an abortion. 55
Furthermore, the court noted that the scienter requirement in
the Act could not save the Act from a vagueness challenge.56 Re-
quiring a defendant to do something "knowingly" is useless if it is
unclear what the defendant would have to "know." Thus, a scien-
ter requirement that modifies a vague term cannot cure that term's
vagueness. 57
The district court next concluded that the Act was unconstitu-
tional for other reasons in addition to vagueness. The district
court held that because the Act effectively banned D & E abortions,
it created an undue burden for women seeking that type of abor-
tion.58 In addition, the Act was declared unconstitutional because
it failed to include an exception for the health of the mother.59
Under Casey, the mother's health exception must apply even after
viability of the fetus.60 Thus, the absence of such an exception ren-
dered the Act unconstitutional. 6 '
Although the Act contained an exception for the life of the
mother, the district court concluded that the exception was insuffi-
cient, and the Act unconstitutional on this ground as well. 62
Under the Act, a partial birth abortion could be performed to save
the life of the mother only where "no other procedure would suf-
fice."63 In the words of the district court, "[if a woman could die,
then she has the constitutional right to have any and all operations
that would save her life."64 Furthermore, the court noted that a D
& E procedure, which could certainly be used to save a woman's
life, was nevertheless banned by the Act.65 Therefore, the inade-
55. See id. at 310.
56. See id. at 311.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 313-14.
59. See id. at 314.
60. See id.
61. See id. The district court also states that this flaw in the Act would render
the Act unconstitutional even if it had been drafted to proscribe only D & X abor-
tions. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-4.12-3 (1956) (Supp. 1999)).
64. Id.
65. See id.
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quacy of the mother's life exception renders the Act
unconstitutional. 66
Finally, the court turned to the private cause of action created
by the Act for the father of the fetus and the maternal grandpar-
ents of the fetus. The court stated lilt is a fact that the private
right of action . . . will cause doctors to require pre-abortion con-
sent from the father of the fetus and the mother's parents."67
Based on evidence that physicians and clinics will require a con-
sent form before performing D & E abortions in order to insulate
themselves from liability, the district court concluded that the bur-
den created by this provision of the Act amounts to an even greater
burden than the spousal-consent provision struck down in Casey.68
Therefore, this provision of the Act is also unconstitutional. 69
CONCLUSION
In recent years, legislatures across the country have at-
tempted to limit a woman's right to choose an abortion in the later
weeks of her pregnancy by passing partial birth abortion bans. In
Rhode Island Medical Society v. Whitehouse, the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that a similar
attempt in Rhode Island did not pass constitutional muster.
Although the district court recognized the often brutal aspects of
abortion, it safeguarded a woman's right to choose an abortion free
from undue burden as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
Sarah K Heaslip
66. See id. at 315.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 316.
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Constitutional Law. State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716 (R.I.
1999). Where a sentencing law has changed between the time of
the criminal offense and sentencing, the amended law applies
where there is no increase in punishment within the meaning of
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, within the meaning of the
Ex Post Facto Clause, a change in the nature or conditions of con-
finement does not constitute an increase in punishment.
In State v. Desjarlais,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether a defendant in a criminal case
could be sentenced to home confinement when the criminal statute
providing for home confinement was amended to exclude the
crimes for which the defendant was convicted after the offense but
prior to sentencing.2 Due to the timing of the amendment to the
law, the court had to determine whether the Ex Post Facto Clauses
of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions were
violated.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On December 18, 1997, a judge found the defendant, Steven
Desjarlais, guilty of one count of driving to endanger, resulting in
death and one count of driving under the influence, resulting in
death for an automobile accident that occurred in February of
1993. 4 At the time the accident occurred, both of these crimes were
included as offenses for which home confinement was a possible
sentence. 5 However, in 1994, the General Assembly modified the
home confinement statute to exclude the offenses for which the de-
fendant was charged from crimes eligible for a sentence of home
confinement. 6 On March 13, 1998, a judge sentenced the defend-
ant to a cumulative term of twenty years incarceration at a correc-
tional facility, of which all but five years were suspended, and
fifteen years probation. 7 The court ordered the defendant to serve
four of the five years incarceration in home confinement.8
1. 731 A.2d 716 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 717.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
672 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601
At the sentencing, the State argued that the defendant was
not eligible for home confinement as a result of the statute revision
in 1994.9 The trial judge rejected this argument.10 In response,
the State filed a motion based on Rule 35 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure to correct the sentence." The motion
was denied by the trial judge. 12 Upon the State's request for re-
view, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island issued a writ of
certiorari. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The State argued that the 1994 amendment to the home con-
finement statute rendered the sentence illegal because the offenses
committed by the defendant were among those excluded from a
possible home confinement sentence. 14 The defendant took the po-
sition that because his accident occurred prior to the amendment,
the sentence was legal. Furthermore, the defendant argued that
application of the amended home confinement statute would vio-
late the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Is-
land Constitutions because the offense took place before the
statute was amended.' 5 The relevant portion of the federal Ex
Post Facto Clause provides that "No State shall.., pass any... ex
post facto law."16 In Lynce v. Mathis,'7 the United States Supreme
Court explained that in order "[t]o fall within the ex post facto pro-
hibition, a law must be retrospective ... and it 'must disadvantage
the offender'. . . by altering the definition of criminal conduct or
increasing the punishment for the crime."'
Retrospective law
In Miller v. Florida,19 the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained that "[a] law is retrospective if it 'changes the legal conse-
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. (referring to U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; R.I. Const. art 1, § 12).
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
17. 519 U.S. 433 (1997).
18. Id. at 441 (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 50 (1990)).
19. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
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quences of acts completed before its effective date.'"20 In the
present case, when the defendant committed the criminal act in
1993, the statute provided that he could be sentenced to home con-
finement.21 However, by the time he was sentenced in 1998, the
statute had been amended and no longer permitted home confine-
ment as a sentence for the crimes for which the defendant was con-
victed.2 2 Application of the amended statute, then, is retrospective
in that it changes the possible legal consequences of the defend-
ant's acts by changing the nature or conditions of his
confinement. 23
Increase in Punishment
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales,24 the
United States Supreme Court clarified the Ex Post Facto Clause by
stating that it does not "require that the sentence be carried out
under the identical legal regime that previously prevailed."25 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on
Morales in Dominique v. Weld. 26 In Dominique, the issue was
whether a defendant's inability to continue to participate in a work
release program constituted an increase in punishment.27 The
Dominique court decided that although "it [could] be argued that
the regulation increases the penalty because it subjects Dominique
to a different and stricter prison regime... this change in the con-
ditions determining the nature of his confinement while serving
his sentence was an allowed alteration in the prevailing 'legal re-
gime' rather than an 'increased penalty' for ex post facto pur-
poses."28 Therefore, based on the court's interpretations in the
preceding cases, changing the nature and conditions of the confine-
ment is not an increased penalty within the meaning of the Ex
20. Id. at 430 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981)).
21. See Desjarlais, 731 A.2d at 718.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
25. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d at 718 (quoting California Dep't of Corrections v.
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510 n.6 (1995).
26. 73 F.3d 1156 (1st Cir. 1996).
27. See id. at 1156-57.
28. Id. at 1163 (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 510 n.6).
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Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions.29
In State v. Quattrocchi,30 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that "home confinement . . .is a form of imprisonment."31
Furthermore, in State v. Mariano,32 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court stated that a sentence of home confinement instead of incar-
ceration in a correctional facility is simply "a change in the place
where [the defendant] is confined."33 Therefore, application of the
1994 amended home confinement statute to the defendant did not
result in an increase in the level of punishment, but merely a
change in the condition of his punishment.3 4 In 1998, when the
defendant was sentenced, home confinement was not an option due
to the 1994 amendment to the statute.35 Therefore, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in his sentenc-
ing of the defendant.3 6 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in its
decision, quashed the sentence imposed by the trial judge and re-
manded for a new sentence consistent with its holding.37
CONCLUSION
In State v. Desjarlais, the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not violated by applica-
tion of a criminal penalty provision amended after the defendant
committed the crime but prior to his conviction and sentencing
where there is no corresponding increase in punishment. In so
holding, the court concluded that a change in the nature or condi-
tions of confinement, such as the distinction between home confine-
ment and incarceration, is not an increase in punishment within
the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Ann B. Sheppard
29. 687 A.2d 78 (R.I. 1996).
30. See Desjarlais, 731 A.2d at 718.
31. Quattrocchi, 687 A.2d at 79.
32. 648 A.2d 803 (R.I. 1994).
33. Id. at 804.
34. See Desjarlais, 731 A.2d at 718.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
